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Ruth Wedgwood *

The Evolution of United Nations
Peacekeeping
Does multilateralism deserve moral suspicion? It is a well-put question,
worth facing prior to our inquiry into peacekeeping. Some of the classical
conditions of peacekeeping will be newly explicable; the classical limits to
peacekeeping fit these moral concerns.
Traditionally, multilateralism has been challenged as a road to lassitude, inaction and self-defeat. The suggestion here is different. Professor
Fernando Tes6n has argued that multilateralism may fall prey to the moral
short-sightedness of a purely self-regarding decision. Indeed, in international law circles, an enthusiasm for multilateralism sometimes brings a
suspension ofjudgment. Even international lawyers who admit the deep
interweaving of law and morality, drift towards a "multilateral positivism"-the presumption that if a decision is reached multilaterally, it can't
be wrong. The Security Council, in this view, becomes a lawmaking institution; its actions create new norms eo ipso. The Security Council is its own
law and sets its own principles. The ordinary inquiry appropriate to the
intervention of one country into another country's affairs, a skepticism or
burden of persuasion for unilateral intervention, turns to credulity if the
action is multilateral.
In unilateral intervention, even upon the avowal of humanitarian or
pro-democratic ends, we check to see whether a national actor is serving
its own self-interest, including domestic political interests advanced by foreign action. We worry about lack of transparency in decisionmaking, the
bluntness of the instruments, and the claims and rights of the target. Multilateral enthusiasms have been quite different. When the Cold War
ended, there was a celebratory feeling; the United Nations had become
unstuck after eons in frozen ice. The Security Council lost its stalemate
and a carnival feeling set in-we really ought to cherish the Council for
what it is doing and worry about the fine points later. In the work of some
observers, there has been a beguiling invitation to defer critical judgment,
enjoying the glow. This is a doubtful move because of politics, lack of
transparency, and the value of autonomy.
The United Nations is a deeply political place. Members consider
national self-interest. To a realist, Security Council action can be
explained as the resolution of political vectors. Each country calculates its
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national self-interest, and the interests of allied cooperative states, while
speaking a universalist vocabulary. As a parlor sport, reverse-engineer the
votes, figuring out who, what and why; you can often point to something
else going on at the time. China's restoration to most-favored-nation status could have something to do with China's abstention in vital Security
Council votes. Partialities may cancel each other out; a multilateral decision may coincide with the impartial view of an "ideal observer." But multilateral decisions can be political and self-serving rather than principled.
As a check, we should ask each time whether a recommended action can
be generalized, or whether it would be worrisome writ large. Our assay
must continue to pay attention to the incidental harm force can work
upon civilians, including enemy civilians, even where the Security Council
is the actor. We must worry about the danger of faint-heartedness as well.
As in Bosnia, a promise of protection can be destructive where real force is
not available to back up the proffer.
Transparency is also lacking in multilateral decisionmaking. The
Security Council often acts behind closed doors. Some General Assembly
members feel aggrieved at their exclusion from the Council's deliberations. This year, troop-donating countries were allowed to have special
consultations with Council members over peacekeeping mandates and the
use of their troops. But a member of the General Assembly cannot waltz
into the Security Council and watch all debates. There are many executive
sessions. The Council is rather like the U.S. Senate in the late 18th century-an often opaque body delivering often opaque results-rather than
the open structure we associate with a modem national parliament. Lacking transparency, a political Security Council and even General Assembly
may not deserve any special deference beyond the perfection of the particular decisions.
Autonomy is the third concern. Although the U.N. Charter states
that enforcement decisions taken by the Security Council fall outside the
reserve of domestic jurisdiction of national states, political autonomy and
local action remain valuable. Just as the European Union values the
return of crucial decisions to the local level, as "subsidiarity," so we should
value a global subsidiarity. A community must take responsibility for its
own course and fate. The U.N. cannot function as deus ex machina. Our
concern about the practice of colonial governance, that it may lead to
passivity and political infantilism, should extend to multilateral colonialism as well. Colonialism was often benign in its purposes, but substituted
another country's will and judgment for that of the local community, and
retarded political maturation.
These concerns about politics, transparency, and autonomy help to
account for the lingering orthodoxy of peacekeeping doctrine. Classical
peacekeeping has demanded minimum force, party consent, and neutrality. These doctrinal tenets, as we shall see, flank and avoid foundational
questions about multilateral decisionmaking. American bewilderment at
European reticence in peacekeeping may follow from not understanding
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these worries about how multilateral institutions might be misused.
Foundationalism can be avoided if little is at stake.
Minimal use of force is the first tenet of classical peacekeeping.
Though peacekeepers wear military uniforms, the enterprise is closer to
pacifism and the ethos of non-violence than to war-fighting or active
police. The Lester Pearson/Dag Hammarskj6ld account of peacekeeping,
in the wake of the Suez crisis, was Nordic Minimalism. This sensibility
eschews force wherever possible and rejects the instrumental use of arms
to push through to a desired end. Peacekeepers are soldiers as a matter of
appearance more than function. A peacekeeper can shoot back if personally threatened, but only after exploring other measures, including remonstration, retreat, and warnings. Peacekeepers bear a close resemblance to
civilian observers and relief workers who just happen to carry a sidearm
with a bullet for the last exigency. The idea in classical peacekeeping, by
the account of early adherents, is not to use armed force to advance an
end, but rather to use moral witness, reportage, presence, and humanitarian assistance, even in a mission undertaken in the midst or aftermath of
fighting. Peacekeepers will monitor a truce or separate former combatants, but will not repel one side if it breaks through the truce line.
Consent is the second classical condition. Peacekeepers are present
by invitation, in a consensual deployment. If one party balks, the
peacekeeper has to leave. Scruples about the justification for intervention-politics, transparency, and autonomy-are avoided because the
monitor remains as a delegate of the parties. Consent is wholesome justification, and we needn't pursue rabbit trails on whether there are limits to a
party's ability to bind its will, since the consent is continuous and
revocable.
Neutrality is the third condition. This also goes to party autonomy,
but with a very different set of moral problematics. The peacekeeper is
required to be neutral between the parties to a conflict, to make no judgment on the merits of the underlying dispute. He is not to impose a political solution; indeed, if he tries, one of the sides would withdraw its
consent. Peacekeepers are to carry out functions no one quarrels withobservation, civilian assistance, humanitarian aid.
The classical condition of impartiality has made many of us chary
about the whole enterprise of peacekeeping in the current circumstances
of Yugoslavia. Civil wars are one of the most morally unregulated activities
of modern life. There is no theory of distributional justice in a civil war.
It's pure tooth and fang. Pure Darwinianism. Whoever is stronger wins.
There is no international standard that bars the use of force by a domestic
party seeking to win a civil war. To have the United Nations deeply
involved in the neighborhood, while the unregulated use of force proceeds between the parties, is uncomfortable for people who think of international order as morally laden.
The challenge made to multilateralism-for its politics, lack of transparency, and burden on autonomy--rationally explains the classical conditions of minimal force, consent, and impartiality. A limited presence,
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the milk balm of consent, and equidistance from the parties help skirt the
question of how multilateral decisions should be justified, since little is
being done. Whether all issues of legitimacy are successfully avoided is
another matter, especially if one believes there are affirmative duties to
act.
Our immediate subject today is the origins and current health of U.N.
peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is often criticized by hard-headed realists,
who don't have much time or money for humanitarian causes, Unsavored
by these skeptics is a key historical fact: Peacekeeping is deeply connected
to strategic conflict. Many early operations stemmed from the need to
neutralize and quarantine quarrels with strategic potential. The early
Cyprus operation is an example. The United States worried that its two
NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, would grasp each other's throats over
Cyprus. Especially after the coup of the Colonels, it was important to prevent intra-alliance violence, and peacekeeping was key. The Congo crisis,
an early occasion for nation-building, saw the U.S. request, invite, even
implore the United Nations to undertake the operation, lest the Soviets go
in.
Many current operations stem from the devolution of strategic conflicts. Consider El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia. One of the
reasons why, despite the rhetoric on Capitol Hill, the United States is so
deeply interested in these missions is that they are the d6nouement, the
winding-down of old battles for influence in the Third World between strategic opponents. Peacekeeping is not pure humanitarianism. Peacekeeping has provided an important buffer between dangerous nuclear
adversaries. India and Pakistan in the Kashmir Valley give another example. The purpose of dampening potential strategic conflict is why superpowers were long considered to be disqualified from acting as
peacekeepers. The point of peacekeeping was to de-escalate conflicts that
otherwise might pit East and West against each other, to keep the superpowers safely in their corners.
Three popular cultural images summon the evolution of peacekeeping in its new form. The first is the man who came to dinner. As soon as
you invite him in, his shopping bag full of papers and cans, you know you
will never get rid of him. This is what the military calls "mission creep."
Peacekeeping has the added moral spin of the good Samaritan's special
duties, falling upon those who become involved. The common law of torts
says that you do not have to rescue somebody, but once you begin to rescue, you have special burdens. There is a moral difference between the
stranger and a participant in a relationship of affect or reliance.
The second image is from our political history: Herbert Hoover and
the Belgian relief of the post-World War I period. Hoover embarked on
an extraordinary mission to rescue the European continent from starvation after World War I. The fighting had ended and the immediate problem was food delivery, but the continent was prostrate. The breathless
daring of Hoover's reconstruction, later repeated in the Marshall Plan, is a
key precedent for the ambitions of nation-building in peacekeeping.
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The third memory is the Vietnam War. Many of the tasks peacekeeping presents are not so different from the ambitions we had in Vietnampolitically remaking a society in a way we prefer. The most haunting document in peacekeeping is a small handbook published by the United
Nations on behalf of two Russian authors which lauds the efficacy of
Vietnamese counter-insurgency operations as a model for peacekeeping.
The frustrations of Vietnam should allay our surprise when peacekeeping
missions do not succeed in remaking a society on an emergency basis. At
the same time, the success of some peacekeeping operations in demobilizing combatants, bringing insurgents into a process of negotiation, and catalyzing the change from civil war to politics, is a partial curative to the
disillusionment of the Vietnam War.
Scale has changed from the classical period of peacekeeping. The
number and size of operations has exploded over the last five or six years.
Anything growing so fast will have management problems. The U.N.
budget for peacekeeping multiplied in six years from 230 million to 3.6
billion U.S. dollars. The number of operations has increased from five to
seventeen, and the number of soldiers on the ground from 10,000 to
70,000. Quick growth, in a difficult-to-manage multilateral organization, is
likely to have some deformities, and not to be keenly structured.
The scope of our ambition has also changed. Peacekeeping now
looks like a summary of all the hopes of the 1960's and 1970's for development aid and political transition-to somehow remake emerging countries as prosperous, democratic, and stable societies. The old classical
mission of peacekeeping-interposing lightly armed troops to monitor a
truce, to observe, perhaps to rebuff some small trans-border terrorist incidents-has been transformed. The menu now includes complicated postconflict tasks (cantoning and demobilizing combatants, supervising elections, establishing working judicial systems) and even more devilish tasks
during war, such as delivering humanitarian aid, preventing genocide (as
in the attempt by the French in southwestern Rwanda and what we hoped
for in Bosnia), handling massive refugee flows, such as the million people
crossing the border in a two-week period from Rwanda into Zaire, and
figuring out how to sustain refugees during their exile. There is some
hope of limiting war's destructive effects and lowering civilian casualties by
discouraging violations of the law of armed conflict, jus in bello. These
were formerly addressed only after the fact, once the conflict was over, by
a war crimes prosecution, truth commission, or historical judgment. Now
we suppose that even while the conflict is unfolding, we should be able to
limit the abuse of war-fighting techniques, by garnering public opinion,
imposing economic sanctions, or threatening retaliation. We have not
succeeded by any measure in the former Yugoslavia, where the dreadful
practice of ethnic cleansing continues, with such jus in bello violations as
bombardment of residential areas in cities and the execution of civilians.
But discouragement should be tempered by realizing that our ambitions
have greatly expanded.
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We are also using Chapter 7 enforcement power for the first time in
peacekeeping. In Somalia, and in elements of the Yugoslav operation, the
Security Council authorized peacekeepers to operate even without the
consent of the parties, under Chapter 7 enforcement authority. Even
where consent is claimed, for classic Chapter 6 1/2 peacekeeping, often it
is constructive, even fictive: acquiescence rather than vocal agreement,
consent by a dlejure leader who lacks local control, or a de facto war lord
who lacks any representative legitimacy.
Now to some of the current problems and controversies in peacekeeping. The first problem with peacekeeping is its uneasy resemblance to
colonial guardianship. Some observers speak of "failed states"-a locution
resented by the developing world, which points out that European state
formation was a slow and difficult process. The "failed state" proposal calls
for the United Nations to step in, perhaps through the Trusteeship Council, when local leaders are unable to stem anarchy or govern effectively. At
times there is almost an intimation that sovereignty does not properly
belong to people who cannot employ it well. What sounds so utterly
benign as peacekeeping can devolve into a kind of multilateral condescension. While I don't believe in accepting human suffering as growing pains
(the whole corpus of international human rights law argues against that),
nonetheless, the need to respect autonomous political development
remains, whether it is a multilateral or a unilateral intervention.
The second great debate is over the use of military power, with a postVietnam ennui about the efficacy of force. Sometimes, indeed, there isn't
much achievable by the direct application of military force. To our frustration in Bosnia, for example, even where we know what type of territorial
settlement we would like the Bosnian Serbs to accept (whether we say it
aloud or not), air power in a mountainous region may not be adequate
persuasion. Without thousands of ground troops to secure the area, a military solution may be unavailable. High technology, so efficacious in
Desert Storm, doesn't serve half so well in the intricate terrains of civil
wars, against unsophisticated combatants who are not subject to hierarchical command and control, who may not even see themselves as a single
political unit. What the United States learned in Vietnam, others are
beginning to learn too. At the same time, Americans have a peculiarly
impatient account of military force. We are wedded to the Weinberger
doctrine: Massive quick force. This was the theory of General Grant and
General Eisenhower. We go to war rarely, but when we do, it's to be overwhelming and finished with lightning speed, a defensive blitzkrieg. The
French and the British have a more imperial sense of using force around
the edges, finessing, perduring, managing, enduring, temporizing. The
American approach may be less suited to the task of policing civil war conflicts. This will be one of the great tests of Bosnia-to see whether the use
of force American-style can help stem the fighting.
The United Nations faces another problem: it has reached the limits
of its operational capacity. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations
is staffed by wonderful people, overworked and dedicated. But at the
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same time, the organization was never set up to be a military command
center. It has gained operational capacity very slowly. It finally has a 24hour situation room. The United Nations still lacks real-time intelligence.
It lacks satellite telephones to communicate straight to the field. For
example, in the Rwanda emergency, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had
no direct link to the head of the UNAMIR troops, interfering with assessment of the situation. The United Nations decisionmaking apparatus is
diffuse. It's as if you tried to run a war through a faculty meeting-gaining
consensus among very fractious people and then trying to get the dean to
transmit the message accurately. The missing military infrastructure, the
archaic qualities of the Secretariat, and the preeminence of members'
inconsistent political wills, mean the United Nations does not have a
sophisticated capacity to run military operations.
There is now the chastened sense, even within the Secretariat, that if
an intervention involves enforcement, it must be contracted out to a willing country or coalition, a "coalition of the willing" who are militarily able.
Even in more classical peacekeeping operations, the attempt to combine
troops from middle-range powers and emerging countries oftentimes has
not yielded good results. The troops are under-trained, lack equipment,
may not follow ordinary discipline, and even violate the laws of armed
conflict. Our ambitions for peacekeeping may have outstripped the available instruments.
There is a worry as well about contradictory aims for the United
Nations. The organization's diverse aims may be incompatible. Jan Eliasson, who was Under-Secretary-General in charge of the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, worried aloud before he resigned that the humanitarian purposes of development aid and refugee assistance could be
prejudiced by the attempt to get into enforcement operations. Even if aid
agencies are based in Geneva and the security apparatus in New York, this
subtle difference is lost to a person on the ground in Mogadishu. U.N.
workers don't wear different emblems or different color hats. The acceptance of a humanitarian aid worker may be withdrawn in anger at a military
operation. The U.N., some say, is at risk of losing its development and
humanitarian soul, when its public face is martial.
The moniker of peacekeeping is also being stretched to serve as a
polite cover for quite different political aims, multilateral and unilateral.
For example, much of what the United States seeks to do in Europe today,
in the enterprise of bolstering Eastern European friends against any resurgence of Russian power, is done under the heading of peacekeeping. We
have been conducting civil defense exercises with former Warsaw Pact
countries, including Poland and the Ukraine. A conciliatory label makes
the joint exercises less objectionable or provocative to the former Soviet
Union. The polite title of peacekeeping has been applied to Partnership
for Peace exercises on humanitarian emergencies, nuclear emergencies,
and environmental emergencies. We practice as well with the Russians, to
remain even-handed. Nonetheless there are two militaries getting used to
each other operationally, marrying up their command structures, getting
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to know each other's doctrine under the guise of peacekeeping. The Partnership for Peace has been a brilliant success. With great respect for
George Kennan, one can call it "soft containment." It is good policy, and
useful in the current political situation in Europe. But applying the name
peacekeeping to these cooperative exercises, runs the risk of corrupting
the meaning of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is not containment.
On the Russian side, "peacekeeping" often looks rather like old Soviet
hegemony. Take the counter-insurgency operations conducted in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, North Ossetia, and Ingushetia. You can call it peacekeeping. You can call it empire. Bill Odom of the Hudson Institute pointedly
observes that it looks a lot like Grachev asserting the old sphere of influence of the Russian bear; calling it peacekeeping does not change its hegemonic dominance. In memory of Orwell, one should avoid the
multiplicative use of the word "peacekeeping" as a palliative for everything
that unilateral powers wish to undertake.
There is at the moment no sufficient theory of triage for intervention.
One can pose standards in the abstract. The United Nations ought to
intervene where there is a great loss of human life or limb, or where there
is great danger to stability in the region, and intervention can be accomplished at reasonable cost to life and fortune. But one cannot always anticipate how crises will play out, and, to be effective, one must often
intervene before the costs of inaction have become apparent. General
Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of UNAMIR, maintains he
could have prevented the Rwanda slaughter if only he had a thousand
good men and true in Kigali, at the right time. The mandate was not
forthcoming.
In fact, the situations of intervention have been catch-as-catch-can,
CNN, sentimental relationships, but not subject to any great theory of
moral or politicaljustification. We did Somalia. We didn't do Sudan. We
didn't do Burundi or Rwanda for several times around. This absence of
articulate theory may not be an urgent moral problem because the
number of crises where we ought to intervene will dwarf our capacity. But
theory might help us rank-order crises, and perform a political triage. The
chafing by some U.N. members at Security Council action-that
peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention not become a plaything of
the permanent five members of the Security Council-is in part because
we lack an adequate account of when to go in, and when not.
Finally, let me say a few words about the U.S. role in peacekeeping.
This is a red-hot issue in Washington. To be sure, the Contract with
America featured in the 1994 Congressional elections said nothing that
demanded withdrawal from peacekeeping. The Contract called for adequate command and control of U.S. troops and protection of vital American security interests. One can make a strong argument that increased
support for peacekeeping is the most faithful interpretation of the Contract with America, since peacekeeping helps to manage regional conflicts
while spreading the cost. Nonetheless, House and Senate Republicans
brought forth the proposal that the United States withdraw from any sig-
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nificant role in peacekeeping. The United States is the largest financial
contributor to peacekeeping. We pay, in current assessments, 30.4% of
peacekeeping costs, although we do not donate many troops.
What the Congressional Republicans have built upon is the anxious
sense that the United States lacks a settled account of its own proper role
in peacekeeping. U.S. troops face unusual difficulties as peacekeepers in
most operations. An early disqualification was strategic-the whole point
of peacekeeping was to neutralize conflicts and avoid involvement of the
superpowers. A newer reason why we are disabled from peacekeeping is
that the United States is too credible as a retaliatory force. If an insurgent
is looking for attention, and takes a Nordic peacekeeper hostage, there is
not much his country can do about it. But if an American is taken hostage, there is the expectation from the Iranian hostage crisis that we are
going in with lasers and gunships. American peacekeepers become
targets, and this can escalate rather than de-escalate the conflict. American war-fighting doctrine does not fit the traditional ethos of peacekeeping. On a recent panel for West Point cadets, there was a pitched battle
between Colonel James Terry, legal counsel to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and Colonel Torav Nordb0, military advisor to the Norwegian mission at the United Nations. Colonel Terry talked about the Weinberger
doctrine, and the need for overwhelming force. Colonel Nordb0 uttered
a cri de coeur, asking why there was a quantum theory of military force that
disdained graduation. Exposing peacekeepers to possible harm, minimal
use of force, an almost Quaker-like self-restraint, is foreign to the way we
have been schooled to fight since Vietnam. Some military observers
believe that you cannot adapt American fighting forces to peacekeeping
without changing the military's whole character and set of reflexes. At the
Fort Polk peacekeeping exercises in August 1994, mock negotiations were
held between the two civil war combatants. The American commander
came into the mediation meetings with his tin hat on and camouflage
paint. It took the British observers awhile to explain that a combative
demeanor was not always what you wanted to use in this kind of negotiation, which mixes civil and military concerns in a very complex brew.
So there is a sense that the post-Vietnam Weinberger doctrine makes
the United States psychologically unsuited to engage in peacekeeping.
The question is, what else are we to do? The United States is badly needed
for some things: only our military has airlift adequate for transcontinental
operations. We have better logistical support, and better real-time intelligence than anyone else. And then there is money. But it is difficult to
conceive of limiting our role to supplying a supportive infrastructure. Our
political leadership probably depends on some participation on the
ground, since casualties are a sensitive issue for every country.
The United States could also help the United Nations plan and put
together political coalitions. At the moment there are no templates for
peacekeeping operations. They are invented with a blank piece of paper
each time. There are no standard scenarios to be adjusted. There are no
operational plans for which country can donate "packages" of military or
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humanitarian aid in varied geographic settings or crises. Very slowly the
United Nations is getting an inventory of what, in theory, each country
might be willing to earmark, but this is done without thinking through
real and predictable political sensitivities. Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the High
Commissioner for Refugees, is forced to dial for dollars each time she has
an operation, begging for a water package or a sanitation package. The
United States could be tremendously helpful in sophisticated planning.
Desert Storm was brilliant in so many ways, especially in the planning of
operations. The United States could also help with multilateral diplomacy, the art of soft arm and strong arm, to persuade countries to take
part in operations. Instead, we have been mocking the United Nations for
not equaling our multilateral diplomatic capacity without realizing that we
are indeed the U.N.
In military doctrine we've done very little in trying to game what can
be done with interpositional forces to prevent conflicts from spreadinghow to work early cantonment in a genocidal situation. The military services have yet to look at how reasonable force structures might prevent the
escalation of civil wars.
These are some of the problems that remain. This is a wonderful and
terrible time to talk about peacekeeping. The U.N. presence in Bosnia
and throughout the former Yugoslavia remains problematic. In March
1995, Croatia threatened to withdraw its consent to the presence of U.N.
peacekeepers, taunting the Security Council to deploy peacekeepers by
Chapter 7 mandate rather than by Chapter 6 1/2 consent. In Liberia, and
in the former Yugoslavia, there still is a sense that conflicts have been prolonged by the presence of peacekeepers; humanitarian aid resupplies the
combatants; having peacekeepers on the ground too easily serves as an
excuse to fail to intervene in other ways.
Peacekeeping has a singular origin in a kind of ethical nonviolence.
At the moment, its future is in jeopardy. We can celebrate many of its
purposes, such as delivering food on the ground to Sarajevans. But
peacekeeping operations have also bitten off more than we can chew. The
faint-hearted ask that we walk away from the challenge. But the optimists
assume we will keep plugging and, in the best American spirit, turn things
around.

Questions and Answers Following the Morning Session
QUESTION: For Mr. Lee, are you outlining a new test for U.N. intervention? From the point of view of the U.N. bureaucracy, is there a power to
say plainly that this is an operation we can't carry out?
Roy LEE: I think you have raised a very important question going to the
heart of the problem. Mandates are created by the Security Council. The
Secretary-General is requested to implement the mandates. Sometimes,
because of divergent national interests, the mandates are not very clear or
are impossible to implement. Nevertheless, from the process point of view
and institutionally and constitutionally, the Secretary-General has to
implement them. And there are a great many problems in the process of
implementation. The Secretary-General does not have the power, really,
to challenge when a decision has been made. Hejust has to do his best to
implement them.
So I think this raised a very good, very basic question which Professor
Wedgwood and Professor Tes6n have mentioned: Can the Security Council do wrong? Look from the legal point of view. If a Council action is
wrong, first, you don't have to vote for it; second, after a decision has been
taken, you can ask procedurally to reconsider it; and thirdly, if the General
Assembly does not agree with the decision or the mandate, the Assembly
can ask for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.
So far, none of these measures has been resorted to. Why? It shows this is
not really a legal question, but basically political. The legal means are
available, but there is no will to resort to these. And consequently,
whatever the Security Council decided, according to the procedure,
becomes the law and has to be implemented. I think this raises a very
basic question we need to consider.
Can I add an outsider's comment, since I am not
restrained by Secretariat politeness?
The bully pulpit that the Secretary-General ought to exercise, telling
members plainly what he can do or can't, will be available only where a
Secretary-General is committed to serving just one term. The current Secretary-General has twenty-three months to run on his first term, and says
he is not yet ready to make up his mind about a second term, he'll see
later, and will have to ask his wife. It is widely believed that SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali would like to serve a second term, if his re-election
is not opposed. But the problem faced by any Secretary-General is that
you can't get elected if you displease one of the major powers. So that is
one problem: a Secretary-General can't speak freely while running for
office.
A second problem is univocality. Even though many of the specialized agencies run independently, the public sees them as part of a single
institution. The public face of the U.N. has been the Secretary-General.
These agencies do not vocalize to a broader political public their own
judgment whether it is possible to participate effectively in the security
RUTH WEDGWOOD:
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missions designed by the Security Council, indeed, whether their own programs might be jeopardized by a particular peacekeeping or peace
enforcement operation, per Jan Eliasson's complaint.
QuEsrION: What is the evolution of international law on sovereignty?
TESON: I don't know the answer to the complete question of
where the evolution is going toward. I can tell you what I think part of the
problem is. If you believe that statehood and sovereignty are ends in
themselves-so that, for example, it is a very bad thing that sovereignty is
collapsing somewhere-then of course you will be concerned about a
number of things. You will want to preserve the sovereignty of the unity or
entity that is collapsing, failing. You will be nervous about intervening for
many of the reasons that Ruth said: you want to care about people, about
their autonomy, even if it is failing.
On the other hand, if you introduce some idea that sovereignty is not
a self-sustaining concept, but rather serves other ethical goals, then a sensible approach would combine some of the concerns that Ruth mentioned,
allowing people to guide their own destinies, with an awareness that we are
talking about "failed" states or problematic societies. The structures may
not be serving the people, the moral goals or the ethical goals or the legitimate goals that sovereignty should help. Therefore I think the United
Nations should be more willing to do some of the things Ruth mentioned-going in and helping refashion the local institutions so they
respond to the needs of the people in a legitimate way and a realistic way.
FERNANDO

RuTH WEDGWOOD: Peacekeeping also comes from the growth of international human rights law-going behind the dejure government to look at
the rights and claims of the people, including minority nationalities. One
of the great successes of peacekeeping operations has been a formal
beginning to democracy-the conduct of complicated elections in Cambodia and El Salvador and Mozambique, with people going to the ballot
box for the first time. I do worry, from a more sinister view, that there are
many ways people will express consent and resistance, and the formal act
of casting a ballot is only one of them. Fighting to the death is another.
In realpolitik, where we want to achieve an outcome that is reasonably
stable over time and that reflects people's true preferences, electoral formalism may not be sufficient. One hates to give place to standing armies
and people with bigger bodies. But intensity of preference is deeply registered in civil wars. For "failed states," as we discovered in Somalia, the
possible superficiality of formal democratic procedures is going to be a
continuing problem.
Roy LEE: One of the basic problems of international law and international
relations at the moment is that they promote the interest of states; the
whole system is state-based, and the U.N. represents these national interests. Other interests are not channeled and are not focused. The primary
purpose of representation in international bodies is to promote state interests. So if we really want to find a solution, we need to see what else have
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we got. Maybe that is precisely the problem. The U.N. reflects the interest
of governments.
Is consent a legitimate basis for coercive intervention
when there is no effective government? How do you determine the appropriate parties from which to seek consent?
DAVID WIPPMAN:

Roy LEE: So far as Somalia is concerned, I would like to invite you to go
back to the history and remember the Secretary-General first wrote a
report on the situation in Somalia. One of the points he mentioned is that
in Somalia there was large-scale starvation, there was no government and
the country badly needed assistance from outside. Therefore he recommended a peacekeeping operation. And then later on, the Security Council decided that force should be applied. So in that case, it was not based
on consent. When it authorized force, the decision was based on Chapter
7. Somalia was quite different from other operations which were based on
consent.
DAVID WIPPMAN: But in Somalia, at least at the outset, the U.N. solicited

the consent of the principal warring factions, and only later turned it into
a Chapter 7 operation.
Roy LEE: That is correct. Essentially you have to negotiate with somebody
in power.
I took your question to be a Fernando footnote. Is the
U.N. misguided in seeking the consent of local warlords? If consent
comes from tribal leaders who have local cultural legitimacy, fine. But
who cares what an unelected thug agrees to. Consent can serve the purpose of minimizing violence. In a non-democratic situation, leaders' consent may otherwise lack any deep connection to political legitimacy.
RUTH WEDGWOOD:

